Introduction
For most countries, competition law is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1950, only ten jurisdictions had competition laws. Today more than 120 jurisdictions do and more than 80 of these systems have commenced since 1980.
1 Officials from these jurisdictions now interact regularly through networked organizations, such as the International Competition Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). There is no binding multilateral treaty mandating that countries have a competition law system that prescribes certain behavior, or create specialized institutions to enforce these prescriptions, although the North American Free Trade Agreement and a number of other free trade agreements signed by the United States (US) have short provisions that require countries to adopt and enforce laws against anticompetitive business conduct. Yet such prescriptions and institutions now exist in all major economies, creating what can be viewed as a transnational legal order, a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions. 2 Combating international cartels is one of the central goals of this transnational legal order, and there appears to be greater normative convergence on this antitrust issue than any other among governments. Countries around the world have increased sanctions against cartels, including in many cases adopting criminal sanctions for the first time, with the term cartels now commonly harnessed to the unsavory epithet 'hard core' to signify cartels engaged in price fixing, output limitations, market divisions and bid-rigging. 3 More than thirty countries have criminalized cartel conduct in some form. All but five have done so since 1995 and over twenty since 2000, and the list is growing. 4 Many states have initiated prosecutions, several have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. Others are significantly increasing the amount of fines for cartel behavior, such that they can be viewed in punitive terms, whether they are formally of a criminal or administrative law nature. Around sixty countries now combine enhanced sanctions with a leniency program pursuant to which the first to confess is immunized from public criminal or civil prosecution, adopting a carrot and stick approach to destabilizing and deterring cartels.
There is, in short, a global trend toward enhanced sanctions combined with common enforcement techniques. Former US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement, Scott Hammond thus proclaimed, ' [i]n the last two decades, the world has seen the proliferation of effective leniency programs, ever-increasing sanctions for cartel offenses, a growing global movement to hold individuals criminally accountable, and increased international cooperation among enforcers in cartel investigations.'
5 Although the US remains the primary user of criminal law as an enforcement tool, and the enforcement record outside the US is relatively slim, the debate over criminalization is active. 6 This debate reflects a general shift in government attitudes toward cartels which earlier were viewed in more benign (or even positive developmental) terms, since cartels could contribute to price stability and labor peace on account of the long-term employment that stable firms with ensured profit margins can offer. 7 This state of affairs raises a series of questions. What spurred the trend toward increased sanctioning and criminalization of cartel activity? Has the move been almost entirely driven by criminalization evangelists such as the US Department of Justice (DOJ), working unilaterally, bilaterally, and through transnational networks? Is the primary explanation cognitive in terms of shared norms of being a 'modern' regulatory capitalist state, as stressed by global polity theory? 8 Or does the shift simply reflect a rational response to the rise of international cartels operating in more than one jurisdiction as part of economic globalization? In other words, is the trend toward criminalization a functional response to regulatory difficulties that transcend national borders in an economically interdependent world, as rational institutionalist theory stresses? Or are organic, bottom-up, national processes also at work? Are we witnessing a change in ideological and <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech-criminal.html>. 6 Beaton-Wells (n 4) 6. 7 'economic theorists and political leaders of the interwar period had often praised the potential value of cartels':
David Gerber, Global This Chapter reviews and assesses trends in the criminalization and enforcement of cartel offenses around the world, highlighting their notable features. It notes the change in focus in the US toward addressing international cartels in the 1990s, followed by a shift in focus toward criminal penalties, including jail time for foreign individuals. The US has advocated these changes in international fora, most notably the OECD and the ICN. It has been relatively successful in its efforts to convince countries to enhance sanctions against cartel activity, and to use new enforcement tools such as leniency programs. We thus note the role of US advocacy in these developments. Yet we do not attempt to answer whether the change is rational interestbased or cognitive, since we find that there is support for both explanations. 10 Rather, we focus on developments in formal law compared to actual enforcement, the mechanism of diffusion through networks, and the challenges posed for formal criminalization policies to be applied. Criminalizing competition offenses and actually enforcing those prohibitions are two different propositions.
Part 2 addresses changes in the law-the 'law on the books'-in a number of jurisdictions, starting with the US and the European Union (EU). It highlights the enactment around the globe of increasingly severe penalties against cartel activity, and the increased adoption of criminal sanctions, which follows the US lead. Part 3 examines enforcement trends in the US, the EU, and other countries, starting with the increased focus of US enforcement policy on international cartels and on the application of criminal sanctions against individuals. Part 4 addresses transnational cooperation efforts in combating cartels, focusing particularly on the role of the US-initiated ICN, as well as the ongoing substantive and peer-review work of the OECD. Part 5 examines two new developments regarding enforcement techniques, the enhanced threat of extradition for cartel activity on account of mutual criminalization, and the proliferation of leniency programs to destabilize cartels, which are used as a carrot to complement the stick of more severe sanctions. Part 6 addresses the central impediments to these trends, and in particular the challenge of obtaining sufficient social and political support for criminalizing cartel activity and the impact of different institutional legacies, especially where criminal and competition law responsibilities are divided among different authorities.
2.
Legal change across countries: the law on the books
Overview of policy developments
While twenty years ago cartel prosecutions were largely the province of the US DOJ, a broad range of countries have now adopted enhanced sanctions against cartel offenses, including 9 For an analytic framework for assessing transnational legal processes and their impact, see Shaffer (n 2); Halliday and Shaffer (n 2). See also Harold Hongju Koh, 'Bringing International Law Home' (1998) 35 Houston Law Review 623. 10 To start, rational interest-based responses operate within particular cognitive frames, which affect the policy goals pursued.
criminal sanctions now being available in over thirty countries. Around thirty-five countries have criminalized cartel conduct in some form; most of them since the mid-1990s, and the list is growing. We compile these countries as of the end of 2012 in Table 1 at the end of this chapter, noting the date of criminalization, the conduct covered, and the sanctions provided. We also highlight those countries that appear to be more serious about criminal prosecution in practice, although in many cases we do not yet know how sanctions will be applied because of the novelty of the legal trend.
The leader in the move toward enhancing sanctions against cartels has been the US, now joined by the EU. Although the EU itself applies only administrative fines to undertakings and not individuals, these fines are punitive enough that EU Advocates-General view them as 'quasicriminal,' and over half of the EU member states have criminalized at least some forms of cartel activity. More recently, other OECD countries have followed suit, as have the BRICS-Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. As John Connor writes, 'with the adoption of an antitrust law in China in 2007, virtually all the world's leading economies have made cartels illegal.' 11 Whereas cartel activity earlier was not viewed as problematic, and seen as possibly even conducive, to national economic development, most leading economies have now significantly stiffened sanctions against cartels, reflecting a sense of social opprobrium, at least in the books. The trend toward punitive administrative sanctions has facilitated the move toward criminal sanctions as an enhanced deterrent.
Yet scholarly attempts to assess global patterns of criminalization are limited.
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Christopher Harding rightly notes that any such attempt will necessarily be plagued by problems of definition and legislative complexity. 13 Some systems, for example, prosecute cartel offenses as both administrative and criminal offenses. It thus may be difficult as a practical matter to disentangle administrative fines and surcharges from 'criminal fines.' The growing trend toward 'criminalization' (broadly construed) also masks crucial differences between jurisdictions. Harding concludes that empirical study reveals 'very much a patchwork of criminalization' involving local legal traits.
14 Apart from Canada and the US, little of other countries' 'criminal legislation pre-dates the 1980s, and much of it has a more partial or tentative character.' 15 For example, criminal sanctions can be imposed for bid-rigging in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland, but such conduct can be viewed as more akin to fraud and thus distinct (for such jurisdictions) from that of cartel offenses. In some jurisdictions, only criminal fines may be imposed, and in many others, only fines are used in practice, so that they lack the social sanction and potential deterrence value of jail time. Canada, for example, prosecutes individuals, but even where successful, the individuals typically only receive a conditional sentence pursuant to which they provide community service. 16 Criminalization of cartel conduct is of a recent vintage, and more limited in scope, outside the US. 18 Harding identified only nine countries in 2006 that are 'to some extent selfconsciously targeting cartel activity by means of criminal law within the context of the recent international campaign against cartels,' listing Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US. 19 This figure, however, has increased since then. An October 2010 Cartels Workshop organized by the ICN placed the figure at more than twenty countries, 20 we show that the figure was more than thirty in 2012, and the list is growing.
US Developments
The US has long been the global leader in aggressively pursuing competition policy. 21 The US first extended the jurisdictional reach of its law to combat foreign-based cartels. As this move was insufficient, the US has since attempted to export anti-cartel policies and enforcement techniques abroad, in particular through the OECD and the ICN discussed in Part 4. The US has criminalized agreements and conspiracies to restrict competition since 1890 with the passage of the original Sherman Antitrust Act, although it would be over seventy years before jail sentences for antitrust violations became common. 22 Originally only a misdemeanor, violation of the Act became a felony in 1974. The US subjects both corporations and individuals to punishment, casting '[t]he net … widely in terms of both conduct and persons.' 23 Cartel participants face large fines, possible imprisonment, and treble damages in civil actions. The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 significantly increased the maximum penalties for antitrust offenses. 24 The Act increased the maximum corporate fine from $10 million to $100 million; increased the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1 million; and raised the maximum jail sentence from three to ten years. The longest prison sentence for an individual to date has been sixty months. 25 If the top end of the range applicable under the US Sentencing Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum, then an alternative sentencing provision available for federal felonies may be employed which can increase fines to 18 ibid 190-91. 19 Ibid 191. 20 Beaton-Wells (n 4) 6. 21 26 The DOJ routinely invokes this provision to justify fines in excess of the statutory maximum. The largest criminal fine under this provision has been $500 million. 27 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ relies heavily on its amnesty and leniency program in its criminal enforcement efforts. 28 The amnesty program grants automatic immunity from criminal prosecution if an entity or individual reports illegal conduct which the Antitrust Division was not previously aware of and truthfully cooperates with the Division in its investigation and any resulting prosecution. The cooperating entity must further not have been the ringleader of the cartel nor have coerced others to participate. Discretionary immunity or reduced sentences and fines are available to entities and individual who cannot meet the full criteria set forth above. To further induce cartel offenders to come forward, recent legislation also amended the leniency program to limit the civil damages exposure of an amnesty applicant from treble damages to the actual damages caused, in addition to providing immunity from criminal prosecution.
EU and EU Member State Developments
Historically, Europe has approached antitrust regulation very differently than the US. While the US approach has been characterized by criminalization and treble damage civil claims, Europe's approach had long been administrative, involving a more consensual process which was often based on voluntary adoption of practices, and which avoided penal sanctions and critical language suggesting moral approbation. 29 Europe's approach began to change in the early 1980s, and has since become increasingly 'American' in its tough-minded approach toward cartels, focusing on their adverse economic impact on consumers. 30 Although EU authorities are still unable to impose prison terms or fine individuals for antitrust violations, and there are significant constitutional and institutional limitations on their ability to do so, they have become much more aggressive in anti-cartel enforcement and there is now a debate as to the advisability of adding a criminal law component to EU competition policy. The EU has significantly increased its penalties for cartel offenses in recent years to the extent that EU Advocate-Generals have called them 'quasi-criminal. ' 32 EU authorities now can assess fines up to 30% of a company's annual sales in connection with the prohibited activities multiplied by the number of years in which the offenses occurred. Fines also now include an 'entry fee'-or automatic fixed penalty-of between 15-25% of the participant's annual sales in the affected sector. 33 While the fines do not change the maximum penalty -10 per cent of a company's total turnover in the preceding business year (whether or not in connection with the prohibited activity -the revisions make it more likely that the fines will approach that limit. 34 Among the more significant developments in the EU are the refinement of its leniency program in 2006 and the establishment of its cartel settlement procedure in June 2008, in both cases following the US lead. 35 The leniency program, unlike the US model, is not backed by the threat of criminal sanction. Yet the program has proven crucial to uncovering cartels in Europe, with the majority of cases in recent years stemming from evidence obtained from a leniency applicant. 36 The settlement procedure is designed to streamline the EU's handling of cartel cases and thus free resources for new investigations. The alleged cartelist is able to review the EU's evidence against it and determine whether to acknowledge its involvement and accept liability for violations of EU competition law in EU territory. Cooperating parties receive an automatic 10% reduction in penalties pursuant to the settlement program, but can obtain full immunity if they are the first to confess pursuant to the leniency program.
The European Commission, through its Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp), and EU national competition authorities established the European Competition Network (ECN) in 2004 to increase cooperation between EU and national authorities, and more effectively share enforcement tasks. 37 The underlying regulation also strengthened authorities' investigatory powers by, for example, establishing their right to seal business premises and books or records, and to interview persons who may have useful information. 38 The ECN has helped competition policy gain stature throughout the EU, and enhanced the authority of the DG Comp and the National Competition Authorities.
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The major focus of sanctions for EU member state authorities likewise is the imposition of administrative fines against corporate enterprises, embedded in a juridical framework. 40 Starting in the late 1990s, and increasing more recently, however, some EU member states have begun to embark on a criminalization project. Over half of the EU member states now criminalize certain cartel offenses, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom, and the list appears to be growing, although Austria, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have decriminalized competition law (except for bid-rigging in Austria). 41 As discussed in Part 3, however, how such criminalization initiatives will operate in practice remains in question as the policies remain circumscribed compared to the US model.
Developments in other Countries
In recent years, a wide range of other jurisdictions, at least formally, provide jail time for cartel offenses. Individuals now face potential imprisonment for cartel activity in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Thailand, and Zambia, in addition to in the US and a majority of EU member states. Moreover, cartel participants are subject to complementary private civil damage actions in a growing number of countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, as well as in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom within the European Union.
The global trend is toward providing for enhanced sanctions against cartels. Many OECD members (in addition to the US and EU member states) have stiffened penalties for engaging in cartel activities, which vary in their civil/administrative or criminal law nature. For example, Canada's Budget Implementation Act of 2009 substantially changed the criminal enforcement regime for cartel offenses by raising the maximum penalty from 5 to 14 years in prison and the maximum fine from $10 to $25 million. Price-fixing, market allocation, and output restrictions are now per se offenses under the law. 42 And as of early 2012, an individual convicted and sentenced to prison under certain provisions of the act no longer enjoys the prospect of serving his or her sentence in the community. 43 Australia recently increased maximum fines to the greater of $10 million or three times the value of the benefit derived from the cartel. Where value cannot be determined, the law provides for a fine of 10% of annual turnover. 44 In 2009, the Australian Parliament criminalized various cartel offenses, providing for up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $220,000 (Aus), and New Zealand is in the process of following Australia in this respect. 45 In the summer of 2009, Japan increased criminal sanctions for cartel offenses, changing its maximum prison sentence for cartel conduct or bid-rigging from three to five years. Japan also raised the statute of limitations from three to five years, and restructured its new leniency program. 46 In 2005, Korea likewise revised its competition laws to increase fines against cartel participants from a maximum of 5% to a maximum of 10% of sales in related goods or services, and to facilitate use of a leniency program. 47 More recently, in 2011, Mexico's Congress approved a new law introducing criminal sanctions of up to ten years in prison for collusion, as well as the ability to engage in surprise inspections, known as 'dawn raids.'
48 Even Switzerland, 'where cartels were "endemic" to the economy,' has recently passed a law providing for administrative fines of up to 10% of a firm's total combined revenue for the preceding three years.
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The BRIC countries have also stiffened penalties for engaging in cartel activities. Brazil has emerged as the new leader in Latin America in combating cartels. Since 2003, Brazil's competition system has eliminated overlapping functions, streamlined cartel investigations, and enhanced authorities' enforcement tools through granting them the power to conduct 'dawn raids' and to use the leverage provided by new leniency and settlement programs. 50 Federal and state prosecutors conduct cartel prosecutions, in cooperation with the agencies forming part of the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS). 51 The BCPS's anti-cartel program has grown steadily, especially since 2006. 52 Brazil's program for criminally prosecuting cartels is recently among 'the most active of all countries,' and includes fines and prison sentences ranging from two to five years. 53 Brazil's leniency program, created in 2000, offers full immunity to the first cartelist to confess, or partial immunity where enforcers were already aware of the cartel. Brazil <http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/169312/Antitrust+Competition/Canadian+Government+Restricts+Availabilit y>. 44 58 In India, 'after a long and troubled gestation,' 59 a new competition act began to take effect in 2009 which stiffens sanctions, including fines of up to 10 percent of an enterprise's turnover, 60 and prison terms for obstruction of justice.
61 Sometimes associated as one of the expanded 'BRICS,' South Africa also in 2009 enacted criminal liability for directors and managers for certain competition law offenses, 62 and has now created a cartel division within its enforcement agency. 63 The impact of these legal changes, however, remains an open question in many countries for the reasons we discuss in Part 6.
3.
Enforcement trends across countries
Overview of policy developments
The prevalence of cartels is difficult to measure. Conspiracies are meant to go undetected, and many, of course, do. Yet because of more robust law enforcement tools and shifting attitudes about cartels, authorities are detecting more cartels than in the past. Scholars and policymakers have attempted to get at the enforcement question in different ways. Economist John Connor has collected empirical data on enforcement in a large multijurisdictional sample. 65 The ICN and OECD offer survey evidence regarding the perspectives of cartel authorities. 66 Critically, however, empirical work on cartel enforcement can measure only detected cartels. One must therefore bear in mind that any conclusions drawing from this empirical work inevitably suffer from selection bias. Methodological difficulties notwithstanding, the overall global trend is toward enhanced enforcement, including higher fines and an increased emphasis on individual accountability with a view toward deterrence, although the level of enforcement varies significantly by jurisdiction as does its deterrent value.
Connor undertook, to our knowledge, the first attempt to assess quantitatively, using a large multi-jurisdictional sample, the magnitude and pattern of global antitrust sanctions imposed against 'international cartels,' by which he refers to cartels involving members from more than one country. 67 Connor presents data on such cartels discovered from 1990-2005 in a 2006 study, and maintains an annually-updated database of all publicly reported sanctions. He selects 1990 as a date that roughly captures the beginning of the current level of sanctions and the harmonization of antitrust laws among the US, EU, and Canada. From 1990 to 2005, authorities took a total of 387 legal actions against 260 international cartels. Legal action includes 'the launching of an official investigation, the filing of a private antitrust damages suit, or the imposition of one or more legal sanctions.' 68 The US, Europe, and Canada commenced the vast majority of these legal actions-128, 101 (including action by both EU member states and the EU) and 56, respectively. In contrast, only seventeen actions were initiated in Asia, and only two in Latin America, against international cartels during this period. Authorities secured a total of 285 'convictions' in these cases, which Connor defines to include consent decrees, settlement agreements, and warnings. He concludes that the data suggests that 'antitrust authorities are by and large cautious about opening formal investigations in the sense that 90 71 This figure regarding 'investigations' includes cartels that were subject to raids, grand jury hearings, class actions, and indictments. At least 6,000 companies have been alleged or proven to be members of international cartels, including about 2,900 ultimate parent companies with known names and locations. At least 1,620 corporations have been fined.
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These cartels alone affected a total of around $16 trillion in sales, with the largest number trading in industrial goods, followed by business and consumer services. 73 Connor finds that the trend across countries toward increased discovery of international cartels is pronounced, with rates of discovery being fifteen times higher in 2005-2008 than before 1994, and having steadily increased between those dates.
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Enforcement patterns vary widely among states and regions. The number of indictments in the US and Canada peaked in the late 1990s, although this shift could suggest that past enforcement efforts and the use of criminal sanctions have been successful deterrents. At the same time, the severity of applied US sanctions has increased. 75 In parallel, the EU has commenced an increasingly large number of cases, resulting in increasingly high sanctions. National competition authorities within the EU have been the biggest prosecutors of international cartels since 2000, and collectively they surpass all other agencies in terms of the number of international cartels uncovered. 76 Other regions have also engaged in increased cartel enforcement, although cartel detections in Africa, Asia and Latin America are comparatively modest. 78 Government fines account for more than half of this total ($35 billion), though private settlements stemming from civil suits (particularly from the US) are also significant, totaling approximately $29 billion. 79 The European Commission has imposed the vast bulk of global fines, followed by national competition authorities within the EU, the US DOJ, and US state Attorneys General. 80 Far behind the US and EU, Korea leads the rest of the world in terms of fines imposed (with approximately $750 million), followed by Africa (less 70 Americans account for nearly one third of all penalized executives. 84 Although the number of individuals charged in the US fluctuated between 1990-2008, the likelihood of sentences has become greater and the amount of fines and length of prison sentences have become increasingly severe since 1990. 85 The US however, remains 'almost unique' when it comes to prison sentences: only Israel is another significant jurisdiction in that respect, followed by Japan. 86 
US Developments
The US has historically taken the global lead in cartel enforcement. In the last two decades, it has done so regarding international cartels and has increasingly focused on criminal sanctions since the late 1990s, including incarceration of foreign defendants. 87 The US reports that it has imposed more than 90% of fines in the past few years in connection with the prosecution of international cartel activity. 88 The result has been increasing US prosecution of foreign defendants. Connor's data shows that in the US, 'prior to 1995, less than 2% of corporations accused of criminal price fixing were foreign-based firms; after 1997, more than 50% were non-US corporations.' 89 The DOJ is typically investigating about fifty international cartels at any one time. 90 Total annual criminal fines increased dramatically starting in 1997, with a record of $1.1 billion in FY 1999. 91 Total criminal fines again exceeded $1 billion in 2009 and 2012. 92 Though the DOJ does not target particular geographic regions or industry sectors, recent years have seen particularly robust enforcement against Asian corporations. Since 2005, the DOJ has imposed cartel fines of $10 million or greater on more companies headquartered in Asia than on those headquartered in every other country combined. 93 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ emphasizes 'that the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity is to hold culpable individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences.' 94 As one US official states, 'our defendants routinely offer to pay large fines in lieu of going to jail, a plea that we reject, but they don't offer to go to jail in lieu of paying a large fine.' 95 Connor reports that the DOJ secured prison sentences for a total of 284 individuals in cartel cases from 1990-2007, of which an increasing number and proportion are foreigners. 96 Since May 1999, nearly fifty foreign defendants have served or are serving prison sentences in the US for international cartel offenses or obstructing a cartel investigation. 97 The percentage of defendants sentenced to jail in cartel cases, and the number of individuals per corporate defendant, have increased. The 1990s saw an average of 37% of defendants involve a jail sentence, whereas the 2009 average was 80%.
98 Sentences are also getting harsher. 99 The DOJ achieved its highest average jail sentence for all defendants in fiscal year 2007, with an average sentence of thirtyone months. That same year, it imposed a record of 31,391 total jail days against individuals, mostly pursuant to guilty pleas. 100 
3.3
The Vitamins Cases and their Impact
In the late 1990s, the US took the lead in a landmark case that had a significant impact on global anti-cartel practices. The ensuing cases in multiple jurisdictions illustrated the potentially grave consequences of cartel conduct for businesses, the public, and regulators. sentencing recommendation detailed an 'extremely well organized operation,' involving at least quarterly meetings and once a year meetings among high-level corporate officials to set an annual 'budget', and project global sales volumes and prices. The conspirators' efforts to conceal the plot were extensive, including the destruction of most documents after meetings and the disguising of conspirators' identities in those documents not destroyed.
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Prosecutions in multiple countries followed the US litigation. In the end, the corporate cartelists agreed to pay unprecedented fines, globally totaling well over $3 billion (in June 2010 USD). This total breaks down as follows: in the US, $900 million in criminal fines and over $1.1 billion in civil settlements; in the European Union, €790.5 million in fines; in Canada, $94.7 million (Can.) in fines and a $132.2 million national class action settlement; in Australia, $26.5 million (Aus.) in fines and a $30.5 million (Aus.) class action settlement (the first in Australia); 104 in Brazil, R$17.6 million in fines.
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The US DOJ criminally prosecuted twelve corporations and fourteen individuals. Eleven executives, including six Europeans, went to prison in the US. It was 'the first time a foreign executive agreed to serve time in US prison for his participation in an international cartel.'
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While other jurisdictions imposed then-record national fines (Canada, EU, Australia, and Korea, for example), only the US imposed jail time. Overall, the vitamins prosecution resulted in greater attention to anti-cartel enforcement around the globe, and spurred the DOJ to increase international anti-cartel cooperative efforts, as discussed in Part 4.
EU and EU member state developments
The EU initially tended to follow the US lead in sanctions against international cartels. The EU's fines in cases involving the lysine, citric acid, vitamins, sodium gluconate, and graphite electrodes cartels lagged behind prosecutions in the US by two to five years. 107 For example, the US DOJ announced its first indictment in the citric acid conspiracy in 1996, whereas the EU announced its decision in that case in 2001.
Over time, however, the EU has steadily become more active in investigating and sanctioning cartels. Although the EU itself still does not impose a criminal law sanction for cartel activity, it has been increasingly aggressive in seeking large administrative fines. Many EU cartel prosecutions involve activity only in EU territory, whereas most of the US cases involve international or global cartels (that is, cartels involving perpetrators in more than one country, or foreign cartels whose activities have effects in more than one continent), suggesting two things. One, that the EU still faces significantly greater cartel activity within its own territory 108 and, two, that the US continues to engage in a more active extraterritorial approach to enforcement, on the other.
There has been 'an explosion of enforcement' against cartels in Europe since the mid1990s, linked once more to the use of leniency programs. 109 113 Indeed, the amount in fines collected by the EU in recent years is many times the amount collected by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ (although it must be recalled that the DOJ also uses criminal sanctions, and the US system also includes more extensive private domestic damage suits).
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On 19 May 2010, the EU announced its first settlement under its 2008 settlement procedure, pursuant to which ten producers of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chips, agreed to pay a total of € 331,273,800 in fines. 115 Participants received a 10% settlement discount for admitting fault and adhering to settlement procedures. Sixteen settlements have thus far been reached under the 2008 procedure. 116 A few EU member states now impose criminal sanctions against cartels under domestic law, although a number limit criminal sanctions to the offence of bid rigging. Between October 2005 and December 2009, the Irish competition authority had secured thirty-three criminal convictions for cartel participants, although no one has gone to jail as the courts have uniformly suspended the prison sentences. 117 This figure includes the first prison sentence in Europe for a non-bid rigging offense, a six-month suspended sentence for the central figure in a cartel involving the home heating oil industry. 118 Ireland prosecuted a total of twenty-four individuals, and secured eighteen convictions, in connection with that cartel. 119 Although Germany has only criminalized the offense of bid rigging, it indicted over 260 persons for this offense during the first eleven years of the statute (between 1998 and 2008), and more than 180 of these individuals were convicted, many of whom are serving jail time. 120 Even in tiny Estonia, authorities initiated eight criminal cases in 2009, three of which were referred to the public prosecutor for court proceedings. Estonia continues to prosecute several cartel cases each year and has been aided by its adoption of a leniency program in 2010. 121 Finally, the United Kingdom (UK) has begun to prosecute cartelists under its 2002 Enterprise Act. The 2007 marine hose prosecution was the first price fixing case brought under the 2002 law, and resulted in the first criminal sanctions ever imposed for competition law violations in the United Kingdom. The U.K. sentenced three executives involved in the marine hose conspiracy to prison terms of thirty, twenty-four, and twenty months, following a US plea bargain (which made the prosecution much easier and the case thus unique).
122 Soon after, in August 2008, the government charged four current and former British Airways executives with fixing prices of fuel surcharges for passenger flights. 123 That trial, however, collapsed in 2010 after a series of procedural and evidentiary failings on the part of the prosecution. 124 Many commentators view this episode as a severe setback for the criminalization agenda in the UK, calling into question its viability. 125 Wide-ranging reforms to the UK antitrust regime came into effect in 2014, including the creation of a new competition body and refinements to the definition of cartel activity that may facilitate future prosecutions. 126 
Developments in other countries
Other countries around the world have adopted new competition laws to combat cartels, reorganized their national competition agencies and devoted more resources to anti-cartel enforcement. These changes are certainly encouraged, if not catalyzed, by increasing transgovernmental exchange among national antitrust authorities within a particular normative framework which portrays global cartel conspirators as evil, contemptuous of the law, and exploitative of customers. 127 Countries around the world have been attracted by US and EU enforcement models and successful prosecutions.
Canada has become more active in prosecuting cartel participants, although the defendants have generally received a suspended sentence so the law has not had nearly the same bite as that of its North American neighbor. Nonetheless, from 1998 to 2008, Canada convicted eleven individuals of cartel offenses, nine were required to pay fines (between CDN$10,000 and CDN$250,000), and the other two received suspended prison sentences. The 2009 amendment to the Canadian Act creates a per se criminal prohibition against price fixing with a maximum sentence of fourteen years which could facilitate further criminal prosecutions. 128 Indeed, the last few years have witnessed a steep increase in conduct challenged by the country's antitrust enforcer. 129 After the amendments came into effect in March 2010, for example, companies implicated in a polyurethane foam cartel agreed to a fine of CDN$2.5 million, for only five months of illegal conduct, under the law's new conspiracy provision. 130 In Australia, survey evidence suggests a majority of that country's public now views antitrust offenses in moral terms, following an extensive public-relations campaign by the Australian competition authority. 131 The survey indicates that 42% of the public believe that cartel conduct should be a crime, and as of 2009 it now is. 132 In addition to the fines imposed in connection with the vitamins cartel, Australian authorities fined six participants in the air transportation cartel in 2008 and initiated proceedings against participants in the marine hose cartel in June 2009. 133 Australia has since aggressively pursued civil penalties -securing fines in the tens of millions of dollars, for example, in connection with a cardboard box and air freight cartel. As of 2015, however, the government has not yet initiated a criminal prosecution for cartel conduct under the new law. 135 In 2002, South Korea fined participants in the graphite electrode cartel-the Korea Fair Trade Commission's first assessment of fines against an international cartel since its creation in 1981. 136 Korea also imposed small fines on three of the sixteen vitamins cartels in 2003. 137 Korea's leniency program is increasingly important; in 2010, the program played a role in 17 of 25 investigations leading to fines. 138 In 2007 Japan imposed prison sentences (ranging between eighteen months and three years) on five executives for bid rigging. The prosecution followed and was the first based upon a leniency application as part of Japan's new leniency program. 139 Despite this enforcement activity, Asia is still a weak link in international enforcement given the size of Asian economies and the profit potential for cartels. 141 Brazil adopted a 'National Anti-cartel Strategy' (ENACC) in October 2009, as part of its second national Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day, in an effort to shape social perceptions of cartel activity and public awareness of government anti-cartel policies. 142 The ENACC has since 'evolved into a network of government and criminal enforcers, headed by a council created to coordinate administrative investigations and criminal prosecution.' 143 Brazil's criminal enforcement efforts have been robust. Brazil fines more hardcore cartels annually and imposes higher average corporate cartel fines than any other country in the region; it is also alone in Latin America in regularly fining cartel managers. 144 Brazil fined participants of the vitamins cartel, and its Secretariat of Economic Law within the Justice Ministry has prosecuted participants in the air cargo and marine hose cartels. 145 Moreover, Brazilian antitrust authorities have succeeded in reaching a number of settlement agreements -in connection with, for example, the marine hose, driving schools, and cement and beef cartelspursuant to Brazil's settlement program adopted in 2007. 146 As of mid-2012 more than 250 executives faced criminal penalties for cartel behavior, and the government had sentenced thirtyfour to jail time ranging from two to five years. 147 Elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico-which has one of the largest and best-funded antitrust authorities in Latin America 148 -fined participants in the citric acid cartel. Although Mexico's competition authority has been preoccupied with mergers and monopoly cases, and has done little to attack cartels, 149 this situation could change following passage of a new antitrust law in 2011 which includes criminal sanctions and more substantial investigatory tools. Focusing mostly on merger control and abuse of dominance, Argentina's and Chile's cartel enforcement programs are relatively underdeveloped. Argentina generally prosecutes only one or two hardcore cartels per year and imposes negligible fines.
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In the Middle East, Israel has been active in prosecuting cartel offenses, possibly reflecting closer normative ties to US antitrust policy. Israel secured jail sentences of between three and nine months for four executives and one economic advisor in its prosecution of a pricefixing and market division cartel involving the floor tile industry. 151 Israel's prosecution of cartel offenses in the liquefied petroleum gas market led to a plea agreement involving jail sentences and fines for three defendants, including a prison term for the CEO of one of Israel's largest gas distribution companies. 152 In more recent cases, Israeli authorities have even arrested executives implicated in cartel activity at the start of the investigation to prevent the executives from interfering. 153 Egypt's first criminal cartel prosecution since the creation of its Department to Protect Competition and Prohibit Monopoly came in early 2008 against twenty cement company executives. By summer's end, an Egyptian court convicted the executives, fining them the equivalent of $1.9 million dollars each for price fixing and agreeing to divide the market. 154 
International cooperation efforts
Transnational initiatives have spurred the diffusion of legal norms regarding cartels and enforcement techniques to uncover and deter them. Throughout the post-World War II era, the US has played a central role in global business regulation. 155 And so it has since the early 1990s in the global trend toward strengthening enforcement tools against cartel offenses, including the addition of criminal sanctions. The global trend coincided with the US DOJ's aggressive stance toward international cartels dating from the early 1990s. 156 The US efforts were supported by a general ideological shift in government attitudes toward market competition following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The US has worked through a number of fora to foster the diffusion of anti-cartel norms, national institution building to address cartels, and transgovernmental cooperation efforts. It has worked particularly through the OECD, the ICN, bilateral treaties, memoranda of understanding, and informal relations. 157 The EU and EU member states have increasingly also played important roles.
OECD
The OECD has addressed competition issues going back to its Competition Law and Policy Committee in 1961. 158 Much of its efforts related to urging its members to cooperate in competition matters. 159 Its efforts significantly intensified against cartels in 1998 when the OECD issued its 'Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels', constituting the first multilateral statement defining and condemning hard core cartels as pernicious. The OECD condemned 'hard core cartels' 'as the most egregious violations of competition law.' 160 The second report on the Recommendation's implementation concluded in similar terms that 'cartels are unambiguously bad,' and the third report cited with approval a 2004 US Supreme Court opinion that cartels are the 'supreme evil of antitrust.' 161 Under its anti-cartel program, the OECD sponsors meetings of national authorities, publishes policy briefs and booklets designed to encourage particular enforcement tools such as the use of leniency programs (discussed in Part 5.2), collects information on sanctions, and compiles lists of best practices. 162 In parallel, the OECD (complemented by a parallel program in UNCTAD) issues peer review reports on individual countries' efforts to detect, investigate, and prosecute domestic and international cartels. 163 It does so with the assistance of the countries' national authorities who become key intermediaries for the conveyance of global anti-cartel norms and practices. The peer review process presses them to cast a critical eye on their own policies, and can provide leverage for them in domestic contests over policy reform. To expand its reach, the OECD established a broader Global Forum on Competition in 2001, and established regional competition centers in Eastern Europe and Asia while sponsoring a Latin American Competition Forum. 164 The OECD's 2005 report on the implementation of its 1998 Recommendation noted 'aggressive enforcement efforts at very high levels, finding [that] competition authorities in more countries than ever bring important cases that resulted in significant sanctions.' 165 The report concluded that 'more countries are catching up and improving their enforcement regimes in line with developments in the most advanced jurisdictions,' and that '[c]ooperation among authorities in investigations of cartels has reached unprecedented levels.' 166 The report detailed illustrative examples of cartel investigations, discussed efforts to raise public awareness of cartel-related harm, reviewed international efforts to cooperate in investigations and enforcement actions, and detailed best practices for formal information sharing. 167 It stressed, for example, that '[m]aking the public aware of the harm caused by cartels is an important part of a country's overall effort to combat cartels,' including through a 'strong media relations programme,' and it pointed to '[t]he programmes developed in Canada and the US' as 'good examples of what competition authorities can do to educate the public.' 168 The report noted the particular importance of 'sanctions against natural persons, placing them at risk individually for their conduct,' and included a subsection on 'A Trend Towards Criminalisation.' 
ICN
The ICN was created in 2001 under US-instigation following an announcement of fourteen competition agencies. 170 It is a network of competition law officials and nongovernmental advisors who have so far come predominately from the private sector. 171 As of May 2015, the ICN is comprised of 132 national, regional, and other territorial antitrust agencies operating in 119 jurisdictions, and the list continues to grow. 172 It is now the central node for the diffusion and building of consensus around competition law norms and practices, facilitating the coordination of transnational regulatory efforts. 173 In 2004, the ICN created a Cartel Working Group. The Working Group's mandate 'is to address the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement across the entire range of ICN members and amongst agencies with differing levels of experience. At the heart of antitrust enforcement is the battle against hardcore cartels directed at price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing and market allocations.' 174 The Working Group contains sub-groups on legal frameworks and enforcement techniques and has produced (among other projects) an anti-cartel enforcement manual for its members' use. Though the OECD did much of the early work on 'hard core cartels,' and continues to be important for policy analysis, the ICN has served to diffuse ideas and build relationships among OECD and non-OECD regulators and practitioners.
The ICN's aim is to foster 'procedural and substantive convergence' of competition law policy through sustained interaction, capacity building, and the sharing of practices.
175 It facilitates deliberation among national competition authorities regarding preferred approaches to use against cartels, as well as to sort out differences. 176 The ICN produces practical guidance, such as the Manual on Anti-Cartel Enforcement Techniques, and organizes workshops and teleseminars, including an annual ICN Cartel Workshop. The Manual on Anti-Cartel Enforcement Techniques, for example, contains chapters on searches, raids and inspections; drafting and implementation of effective leniency programs; digital evidence gathering; cartel case initiation; investigative strategy; and interviewing techniques. In 2005, the Cartel Working Group published the paper 'Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties'. The paper stresses 'the significance of the personal liability of the decision-makers,' and notes that '[s]ome agencies also emphasize the effectiveness of criminal sanctions as a deterrent.' 177 The ICN arguably has been successful in contributing to change in legislation and administrative practice across jurisdictions regarding cartels. ICN member agencies cite the ICN's Cartel Enforcement Manual as a crucial tool in developing national cartel enforcement strategies.
178 US Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott Hammond points to the Cartel Working Group's annual workshops as particularly useful, providing a venue for anti-cartel enforcers to meet, learn from one another, and develop working relationships that form the basis for future cooperation. 179 These informal connections, he writes, have led to 'pick up the phone' cooperation between competition regulators in different jurisdictions over time. 180 The European Commission estimates that the ICN conducts 90% of its work by teleconference or email. 181 Antitrust officials from national agencies around the world have increasingly shared resources and coordinated investigations, creating a sense of a shared professional enterprise. Coordinated activity has expanded greatly, including over the timing of raids and the execution of warrants. 182 The ICN complements bilateral cooperation among competition agencies and governments through anti-trust cooperation agreements and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), which can be used against cartels. The US currently has either a cooperation agreement or MLAT with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the EU, Germany, India, Italy, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and the United Kingdom. 183 National agencies, for example, cooperated successfully to secure plea agreements in connection with the airlines cartel, and coordinated investigative efforts in connection with the marine hose cartel. 184 These agreements reflect the growing role of international coordination in cartel investigations.
Transnational legal norms are more likely to have impacts where they are clear, coherent, and deemed legitimate. 185 The ICN and OECD provide fora in which networks of national competition law officials participate. These international initiatives have expanded their access for officials from jurisdictions around the world. Although the OECD and ICN can be viewed as rivals, the norms that they have conveyed are coherent, and the documents that codify them are precise and elaborate.
The officials who participate in the ICN and OECD initiatives act as intermediaries between the national context and the global one. 186 Where they develop professional identities as competition law enforcers, and where they meaningfully participate in these transnational processes, they more likely view the documents that emerge from them to represent a legitimate expression of a transnational policy consensus. In such situations, they are more likely to actively press for concomitant domestic legal change and engage in enforcement efforts. It is through this web of global, regional and bilateral networks that anti-cartel enforcement ideas diffuse.
The OECD and ICN are just the most important among transgovernmental and transnational networks of legal norm diffusion. The broader network of international competition law and international competition law enforcers includes the UNCTAD that plays an important role for developing nations, as well as a wide variety of non-governmental and academic institutions, programs, and events. Non-governmental advisors representing business and consumer groups, academia, and the legal and economic professions are significantly involved in these processes, so that the processes are not simply 'transgovernmental,' but more broadly transnational. Diffused common norms through both public and private actors facilitate transgovernmental coordination, and the practical experience of successful coordination in a common enterprise, in turn, spurs further normative convergence across and within nation states.
Trends in Enforcement Techniques
Multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts, such as through the ICN, OECD, and bilateral agreements, have circulated new enforcement tools to combat cartels. We address two, the facilitation of extradition through the criminalization of cartel activities; and the use of leniency programs to induce the breakup of cartels.
5.1
Extradition and the Case of Ian Norris Extradition requires dual criminality. 187 This means that the offense at issue must be a crime in both jurisdictions. One consequence of the criminalization of cartel offenses is that more countries may extradite individuals for prosecution in other jurisdictions. The jurisdiction most likely seeking such extradition and most likely to imprison individuals is the US. If extradition to the US becomes easier, decisions for participants in cartels about international business travel become more complex. In March 2010, Ian Norris became the first foreign national extradited to the US to face charges stemming from an antitrust investigation. 188 Norris obstructed the DOJ's investigation into a carbon components manufacturing cartel in which he participated. In November 2002, UK industrial manufacturer Morgan Crucible and its US subsidiary Morganite admitted to wrongdoing in connection with a price-fixing conspiracy. Norris headed Morgan Crucible during a part of the conspiracy and throughout the cover-up. The US indicted him on both counts, and alleged that his offenses were flagrant. He was found to have assembled a document-destruction task force whose sole purpose was to destroy evidence of the price-fixing conspiracy. That task force created a script, designed to mislead investigators, for use by Morgan-entity executives questioned about the conspiracy. After the DOJ investigation became public, Norris instructed his co-conspirators to use the script if questioned about the illicit meetings. 189 A federal jury convicted him of conspiring to obstruct justice on July 27, 2010, 190 and in December 2010 a judge sentenced him to eighteen months in a US prison.
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The Norris extradition has not proved to be a one-off event. In 2014, a former marine hose executive was extradited from Germany to face charges of participating in a worldwide bidrigging conspiracy making this the first extradition for a direct antitrust crime, rather than the obstruction of justice charges in the Norris case. Extraditions will likely become more commonplace as a growing number of countries criminalize cartel activity. As a result, avoiding travel to the US may no longer be sufficient to insulate cartel members from the prospect of spending time in a US prison. Even short of extradition, growing criminalization means substantial travel restrictions and the use of border controls and Interpol to monitor the location of defendants and fugitives. 
Leniency Programs
Antitrust officials point to the proliferation, convergence and coordination of leniency provisions to destabilize cartels as another major development in anti-cartel enforcement around the world. Leniency programs generally provide immunity to the first cartelist to admit liability and cooperate with authorities, with the aim of creating a 'race to confess.' 193 They are used as a carrot to complement the stick of enhanced sanctions, such as criminalization or substantial fines. In some ways, they can be viewed as 'a motor of penal expansion,' as leniency becomes more attractive when the alternative of sanctions becomes more threatening. 194 The program was first developed in the US and has been zealously used there. Gary Spratling, former US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for cartel prosecution, reports that the use of leniency is linked to 90% of US cartel fines imposed since 1997. 195 The US has aggressively sought to promote leniency programs, and the ICN has publicized procedures to aid national competition agencies in implementing them. In 1990, only the US had a leniency program on the books. Today around 60 jurisdictions do, 196 including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK. 197 The DOJ's Hammond thus describes this phenomenon as 'the single most significant development in cartel enforcement.' 198 The diffusion of leniency programs as an anti-cartel enforcement tool again attests to the normative power of the US model diffused through the ICN.
Nonetheless, some might question whether the parallel trend toward global criminalization should enhance or hamper the effectiveness of leniency programs. 199 While Hammond rightly stresses that the threat of harsh sanctions in a jurisdiction should induce cartel members to seek immunity, the cartel participant must also be wary of potential sanctions in other jurisdictions where the cartel's activities have transnational effects. Where the potential sanction in another jurisdiction is penal, the participant's decision may become more complicated, especially in light of institutional divergences for enforcing criminal sanctions and administering amnesty and leniency programs in different jurisdictions so that decisions may lie outside the control of a national antitrust authority. 200 
Impediments to Implementation: Social Norms and Institutional Structures
Notwithstanding the expansion of criminal provisions and the increasingly robust enforcement of cartel prohibitions around the world, actual enforcement will face severe practical limits in most jurisdictions. The implementation of transnational legal norms will ultimately depend on local factors, and in particular, domestic political and social attitudes regarding cartel behavior, and domestic institutional structures, capacities and legacies. 201 Cultural attitudes may be the single biggest hurdle to enforcement trends. Not all members of the public are convinced that cartel offenses merit the criminal penalty of jail time, which is advocated most vocally by the US. Criminalization implicates moral judgments that vary with socio-cultural context. US antitrust law has long exhibited a moral dimension, which facilitates the use of criminal sanctions against individuals in cartel cases. 202 In contrast, 'there appears to be (at least outside North America) no strong feeling on the part of the wider public about the inherent criminality of price fixing and like practices.' 203 National competition authorities outside of North America recognize this uphill battle and thus view public education about the evils of cartel offenses as a central component of their missions. 204 Presentations in October 2010 by competition authorities from Australia and Japan at the ICN's Cartel Workshop in Yokohama, Japan reflect this concern. 205 The 2010 ICN survey extensively reports 'factors influencing perception of importance of cartel enforcement.' 206 To the extent that public opinion supporting criminalization is lacking in many jurisdictions, the transnational trend can be understood as more of a top-down than a bottom-up process. As a result, the impact at the time of implementation could be limited.
Another significant hurdle is institutional, involving particular institutional heritages, structures, and capacity challenges. Jurisdictions in Europe and Asia that have an institutional heritage of using administrative agencies that apply administrative fines against enterprises, as opposed to criminal sanctions against individuals, are unlikely to change significantly, at least in the short term. In addition, for most jurisdictions, criminal law enforcement involves a separate institution from cartel enforcement, creating institutional coordination challenges. A competition agency may wish to retain its monopoly on enforcement, and public prosecutors may not trust competition authorities. In contrast, the US entrusts both civil and criminal enforcement against cartels to a specialized division within the DOJ, which has created a particular institutional legacy that facilitates the use of criminal sanctions. Also, many competition systems are in their infancy and lack institutional capacity. Competition law is particularly recent in China and Egypt, for example, and it has recently undergone a major overhaul in states such as Brazil, India, and Mexico. Finally, there are jurisdiction-specific disincentives, such as constitutional and evidentiary hurdles, which complicate the pursuit of aggressive enforcement. 207 In sum, both institutional legacies and political and social attitudes toward cartels will affect the application of anti-cartel law in practice, especially as regards criminalization. In many cases, we are skeptical that enforcement practice will meaningfully follow the spread of formal legal policies.
Conclusion
Countries in every region of the world, including virtually all of the world's leading economies, have significantly enhanced sanctions and, in a growing number of cases, criminalized cartel offenses, often only recently. Many states have initiated prosecutions, several have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. The US DOJ has played a central role as a unilateral enforcer against international cartels, as a collaborator with other national competition agencies in enforcement, and as an anti-cartel advocate in international fora. International venues such as the ICN now play an important role in offering guidance to national competition agencies, and in providing a forum for policy deliberation, information sharing, cooperation, and professional socialization. Harry First, former Chief of New York state's Antitrust Bureau, goes so far as to declare that we already 'have international 'law' [against cartels] without ever having adopted one at the international level.'
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Since criminal law lies at the heart of state sovereignty, the global trend toward criminalization of cartel offenses is quite remarkable. Yet the criminalization and enforcement records outside the US are hardly uniform. Given the novelty of legal changes in so many countries, and the challenges of institutional capacity for many, we are skeptical regarding actual enforcement in many countries that have formally adopted enhanced sanctions. Even in states that have criminalized cartel offenses, lingering questions remain about the propriety of criminalization and imprisonment. Much of the criminalization trend thus appears to be a product of transnational enforcement interests more than of domestic bottom-up processes. While countries appear to be moving toward convergence on enhanced sanctions, including criminal penalties against individuals, national competition agencies outside of North America are-to borrow from Harold Koh-grappling with the task of bringing home transnational legal norms and practices for combating cartels. 
